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JURISDICTION 
Original jurisdiction lies with the UtaJ^ Supreme Court, but the case has been 
transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4). 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether Hernandez is entitled to judgment as a matter of law against Baker, thus 
precluding relief for Baker under U.R.C.P. 60(b)(1) for failure to show that he has a 
"meritorious defense." 
Standard of Review: Whether a defense is meritorious for purposes of a Rule 
60(b)(1) motion is a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. Lund v. Brown, 
11 P.3d 277 (Utah 2000). 
2. a. Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to enter default judgment against 
Performance Auto & Marine Supply Corp. ("the Corporation"). 
Standard of Review: Whether a trial court lacks jurisdiction to enter judgment 
against a party is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. See State Dept. of 
Social Services v. Vijil, 784 P.2dl 130 (Utah 1989) 
b. Whether Hernandez is entitled to judgment as a matter of law against the 
Corporation, thus precluding relief under U.R.C.P. 60(b) for failure to show a 
"meritorious defense." 
Standard of Review: Whether a defense is meritorious for purposes of a Rule 
60(b) motion is a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. Lund v. Brown, 11 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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P.3d 277 (Utah 2000). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Rules 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure > 
[Note: Rules 3, 15 and 60 are omitted, as they are set forth in pertinent part in the Brief 
of Appellants] 
Statutes 
Utah Code 
38-2-4. Disposal of property by lienholder — Procedure. 
(1) Any party holding a lien upon personal property as provided in this chapter 
may dispose of the property in the manner provided in Subsection (2). 
(2) (a) The lienor shall give notice to the owner of the property, to the customer as 
indicated on the work order, and to all other persons claiming an interest in or lien on it, 
as disclosed by the records of the Motor Vehicle Division, lieutenant governor's office, 
or of corresponding agencies of any other state in which the property appears registered 
or an interest in or lien on it is evidenced if known by the lienor. 
(b) The notice shall be sent by certified mail at least 30 days before the proposed 
or scheduled date of any sale and shall contain: 
(i) a description of the property and its location; 
(ii) the name and address of the owner of the property, the customer as indicated 
on the work order, and any person claiming an interest in or lien on the property; 
(iii) the name, address, and telephone number of the lienor; 
(iv) notice that the lienor claims a lien on the property for labor and services 
performed and interest and storage fees charged, if any, and the cash sum which, if paid 
to the lienor, would be sufficient to redeem the property from the lien claimed by the lienor; 
(v) notice that the lien claimed by the lienor is subject to enforcement under this 
section and that the property may be sold to satisfy the lien; 
(vi) the date, time, and location of any proposed or scheduled sale of the property 
and whether the sale is private or public, except that no property may be sold earlier than 
45 days after completion of the repair work; and 
(vii) notice that the owner of the property has a right to recover possession of the 
property without instituting judicial proceedings by posting bond. 
2 
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(3) If the owner of the property is unknown or his whereabouts cannot be 
determined, or if the owner or any person notified under Subsection (2) fails to 
acknowledge receipt of the notice, the lienor, at least 20 days before the proposed or 
scheduled date of sale of the property, shall publish the notice required by this section 
once in a newspaper circulated in the county where the vehicle is held. 
(4) A lienee may have his property released from any lien claimed on it under this 
chapter by filing with the clerk of a justice court or district court a cash or surety bond, 
payable to the person claiming the lien, and conditioned for the payment of any judgment 
that may be recovered on the lien, with costs, interest, and storage fees. 
(5) (a) The lienor has 60 days after receiving notice that the lienee has filed the 
bond provided in Subsection (4) to file suit to foreclose his lien. 
(b) If the lienor fails to timely file an action, the clerk of the court shall release the bond. 
(6) Property subject to lien enforcement under this section may be sold by the 
lienor at public or private sale; however, in the case of a private sale, every aspect of the 
sale, including the method, manner, time, place, and terms shall be commercially reasonable. 
(7) This section may not be construed to affect an owner's right to redeem his 
property from the lien at any time prior to sale by paying the amount claimed by the 
lienor for work done, interest, and storage fees charged and any costs incurred by the 
repair shop for using enforcement procedures under this section. 
(1996) (1995 version not available to counsel) 
78-18-1. Basis for punitive damages awards — Section inapplicable to DUI cases — 
Division of award with state. 
(1) (a) Except as otherwise provided by statute, punitive damages may be awarded 
only if compensatory or general damages are awarded and it is established by clear and 
convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of the tortfeasor are the result of willful 
and malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing 
and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of others. 
(b) The limitations, standards of evidence, and standards of conduct of Subsection 
(l)(a) do not apply to any claim for punitive damages arising out of the tortfeasor's 
operation of a motor vehicle or motorboat while voluntarily intoxicated or under the 
influence of any drug or combination of alcohol and drugs as prohibited by Section 41-6-44. 
(c) The award of a penalty under Section 78-11-15 or 78-11-16 regarding shoplifting 
is not subject to the prior award of compensatory or general damages under Subsection 
(l)(a) whether or not restitution has been paid to the merchant prior to or as a part of 
a civil action under Section 78-11-15 or 78-11-16. 
(2) Evidence of a party's wealth or financial condition shall be admissible only after a 
finding of liability for punitive damages has been made. 
(3) (a) In any judgment where punitive damages are awarded and paid, 50% of the 
amount of the punitive damages in excess of $20,000 shall, after an allowable deduction 
for the payment of attorneys' fees and costs, be remitted to the state treasurer for deposit 
3 
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into the General Fund. 
(b) For the purposes of this Subsection (3), an "allowable deduction for the payment 
of attorneys' fees and costs" shall equal the amount of actual and reasonable attorneys' 
fees and costs incurred by the judgment creditor, minus the amount of any separate 
judgment awarding attorneys' fees and costs to the judgment creditor. 
(2002) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case is an appeal from the trial court's "Order Denying Motion to Set Aside 
Judgment and Motion to Enforce July 31, 2001 Order." 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition at the Trial Court 
1. Hernandez and his original attorney signed a Verified Complaint on 
December 31, 1996, naming Baker, d.b.a. Performance Auto & Marine Supply, and Does 
I through X as defendants, and stating claims for, first, violations of the Utah Consumer 
Sales Practices Act, second, replevin, third, conversion and/or trespass to chattels, and 
fourth, punitive damages in the amount of $25,000. The Verified Complaint was filed in 
the Fourth District Court for Utah County on January 15, 1997. R. 1-9. 
2. Baker was personally served on January 22, 1997. R. 10-12. 
3. Venue of the action was changed from the Fourth District Court in Utah 
County to the Third District Court in Salt Lake County upon Baker's motion. R. 13-18. 
4. Hernandez moved for entry of default judgment against Baker on 
November 12, 1998, because no Answer had been filed. R. 23-28. Baker opposed the 
motion, stating, inter alia, that he had never been served with a copy of the order 
4 
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changing venue to the Third District Court, nor had he been otherwise notified of the 
actual entry of such an order or the new case number and judge in the Third District 
Court, and that he had not been served with the Verified Complaint since its filing in the 
Third District Court. R. 29-36. 
5. The District Court entered a minute entry decision on the motion for entry 
of default judgment that Baker was to be served with the Verified Complaint again. R. 
19-20. 
6. Baker was personally served a second time, on January 20, 2000, after 
Baker was located at a new address. R. 54-55. Baker filed an unverified Answer 
through counsel on February 11, 2000. PL. 56-61. 
7. Hernandez filed a motion for leave to amend complaint and to join 
Performance Auto & Marine Supply Corp. ("the Corporation") as a party defendant on 
September 21, 2000. R. 71-72; R. 62-70. Hernandez's counsel submitted a "[Proposed] 
Amended Complaint" with the motion to amend and mailed the same to Baker's counsel. 
(See text of motion to amend, R. 71. However, the [Proposed] Amended Complaint does 
not appear in the District Court record. 
8. The District Court granted leave to amend the complaint and join the 
Corporation as requested. R. 78. 
9. Hernandez propounded interrogatories and requests for production of 
documents on Baker and the Corporation in May of 2001. R. 82. At the same time, 
counsel for Hernandez wrote to counsel for Baker and the Corporation inquiring as to 
5 
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why no answer had been made to the amended complaint. R. 105. 
10. The trial court issued an order to show cause sua sponte in June of 2001 as 
trial courts typically do as an ordinary docket management measure. R. 84. 
11. Hernandez filed a motion to compel discovery responses in November 
2001. R. 89-108. Neither Baker nor the Corporation responded to the motion. 
12. The trial court issued an order compelling responses to discovery and 
warning that sanctions will be entered for failure to respond. R. 111-114. 
13. Having received no response, and having no notice of the 
defendants/appellants counsel at the time having changed his address, Hernandez filed a 
Motion for Entry of Default and Default Judgment on July 22, 2002. R. 115-133. 
Hernandez requested a hearing pursuant to Ut. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2) and Code of Judicial 
Administration Rule 4-501 (3)(B) in effect at the time. R. 116. 
14. The District Court entered default against Baker and the Corporation on 
August 23, 2002. R. 138. An evidentiary hearing was scheduled for September 27, 
2002. R. 139. 
15. After hearing testimony from Hernandez, and proffers and argument from 
his counsel, the judge decided to award Hernandez judgment as prayed. R. 141. 
Hernandez's counsel filed an affidavit of attorney's fees and presented the court with 
detailed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and submitted a written judgment for 
signature and entry. R. 142-164. 
16. Judgment was entered against Baker and the Corporation jointly and 
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severally on February 14, 2003, as follows: 
a. $12,500.00 as compensatory damages for the conversion of 
Hernandez's boat and trailer; 
b. Interest at the statutory prejudgment rate of 10% per annum on the 
principal sum of $12,500.00 from the time of conversion until entry of the 
judgment, a period of approximately six years, for total pre-judgment interest of 
$7,500.00; 
c. Punitive damages of $25,000.00 pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
18-1; 
d. Hernandez's reasonable attorney's fees in the amount of $7,539.75 in 
accordance with counsel's affidavit submitted pursuant to Rule 4-505, C.J.A.; and 
e. Hernandez's court costs of $80.00 for the filing fee and $58.00 for 
service of process. 
f. The total of all sums awarded is $52,677.75. 
R. 165-166. 
17. Hernandez had an abstract of judgment filed in the Fifth District Court in 
Washington County, and had a writ of execution issued against Baker's house. See R. 
208 at K 32; R. 375-377. 
18. Baker and the Corporation filed a Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment 
and a "Motion to Enforce July 31, 2001, Order" on May 1, 2003, accompanied by 
affidavits and a memorandum. R. 172-191. Hernandez filed an opposing memorandum 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
with exhibits and an affidavit. R. 201-237. Baker filed a Second Affidavit and he and 
the Corporation filed a reply memorandum with exhibits. R. 280-316. 
19. The trial court issued a minute entry denying the defendants' motions on 
July 7, 2003. R. 328-330. A written Order Denying Motion to Set Aside Judgment and 
Motion to Enforce July, 2001 Order, along with Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, were signed by Judge Henriod on August 12, 2003, and entered of record on 
August 13, 2003. R. 333-338. 
20. Baker and the Corporation filed a Notice of Appeal with the trial court on 
September 8, 2003. R. 339-340. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Facts Supporting or Relating to Order Denying Motions 
21. The trial court found that the defendants the defendants "failed to provide 
'specific' and 'detailed' facts necessary to support their underlying claim and therefore are 
unable to set forth the necessary evidence of a meritorious defense to the action against 
them." R 329; see also R. 337. 
22. At p. 8, second paragraph of the Brief of Appellants Baker and the 
Corporation state that "trial counsel for both parties argued extensively in their written 
memoranda concerning (1) Baker's individual liability under a corporate shield defense 
and (2) whether the sale of the boat complied with the repairman's lien statutes." In 
addition, Hernandez argued below that Baker has personal liability as an intentional 
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tortfeasor above and beyond any liability under an alter ego or "piercing the corporate 
veil" theory. Passim. 
23. Hernandez will call the Court's attention to the facts set forth in the 
Argument section of this brief, infra, wherein it is shown that judgment as a matter of 
law can be upheld against Baker in his personal capacity based on the undisputed or 
indisputable facts and the conclusions of law clearly drawn therefrom. 
Substantive Facts of the Case as Found by the Trial Court 
24. All of the trial court's findings in support of the Judgment are relevant to 
this appeal, and in the interest of economy Hernandez refers the Court to the trial court's 
Findings of Fact, found at R. 154-160, supporting the Judgment. 
25. The statement of facts Hernandez presented to the trial court in his 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Set Aside And Motion to Enforce 
was before the trial court when it decided in favor of Hernandez in ruling on the 
appellants' motion to set aside, and again in the interest of economy, Hernandez refers the 
Court to the trial court record at R. 201-208 and R. 220-237. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The order of the trial court denying Baker's motion to set aside should be affirmed 
because Baker is personally liable for conversion of Hernandez's boat as a matter of law, 
based on undisputed material facts and the legal conclusions which properly follow 
therefrom. 
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The order of the trial court denying the Corporation's motion to set aside can be 
affirmed because the process and notice provided, while not perfect, actually and 
substantively gave notice of the claims against the Corporation and afforded an 
opportunity to be heard, and likely provided a superior level of actual notice than strict 
adherence to the prescribed form of notice would have. 
The award of punitive damages is supported by the undisputed facts, is consistent 
with U.C.A. § 78-18-1, and was within the discretion of the trial court to make. 
ARGUMENT 
I. BAKER'S DEFENSE IS UNMERITORIOUS 
Even under the holdings of Erickson v. Schenkers Intern. Forwarders, 882 P.2d 
1147 (Utah 1994) and Lund v. Brown, 11 P.3d 277 (Utah 2000), Baker lacks a 
meritorious defense which would entitle him to relief under Rule 60(b)(1). In Erickson 
v. Schenkers, the Utah Supreme Court forged a unified holding out of the thin plurality 
holding of State by & through D. ofSS v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1983). 
Indeed, the Supreme Court's unanimous opinion in Erickson v. Schenkers was authored 
by Justice Durham, who wrote the dissenting opinion of Musselman concurred in by 
Justice Stewart. The Supreme Court further demonstrated its solidarity on the 
meritorious defense rule in its unanimous opinion in Lundv. Brown authored by Justice 
Durrant. The essence of the Supreme Court's holdings in Erickson v. Schenkers and 
Lund v. Brown is that a defendant satisfies the meritorious defense prong of a Rule 
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60(b)(1) motion if he presents a clear and specific proffer of a defense that, as a matter of 
law, is entitled to be tried. 882 P.2d at 1149; 11 P.3d at 283. By corollary, if material 
facts are disputed which preclude judgment as a matter of law against a defendant, the 
meritorious defense prong is satisfied. Conversely, if the undisputed (or indisputable) 
material facts support judgment against a defendant as a matler of law, then the defense 
is not meritorious for purposes of deciding a motion under Rule 60(b)(1). 
In the instant case, the following material facts, which support judgment against 
Baker personally as a matter of law, are undisputed or indisputable: 
a. Baker was an employee and/or officer and/or agent of 
Performance Auto & Marine Supply Corp. (the Corporation) during the 
relevant time periods of this case while the Corporation was in existence. 
(R. 193 at 14, R. 194 at f 14; R. 281 at ^ 5 & 6.) 
b. Some time in 1995, Baker was involved (at least as an 
employee, officer or agent of the Corporation, which Hernandez will accept 
for these purposes) in the sale or other transfer of Hernandez's boat, or in 
delivering it, to a third party, without strict compliance with the 
requirements of U.C.A. § 38-2-4. (The Appellants' claim to have complied 
with U.C.A. § 38-2-4 applies to an alleged second sale of Hernandez's boat, 
but Appellants have never alleged that the first sale or transfer of 
Hernandez's boat in 1995 was in compliance with § 38-2-4. Furthermore, 
Baker's denials in his answer to having dealt with Hernandez or his boat are 
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premised on his defense strategy that only the Corporation, and not Baker 
in his personal capacity, had any involvement with Hernandez or his boat.) 
(See Baker's Answer, R. 57 at <[ffi 6 through 14, 16, and 32 through 35, a 
copy of which is included as Exhibit C to the Brief of Appellants; see R. 
292 at f 26, R. 283-4 at ffij 25-26 & 28; note R. 281 at ffl[ 5 & 6 and R. 289 
at 114.) 
c. Daniel Gibbons, acting as attorney for "Performance Auto & 
Marine Supply," wrote a letter to Hernandez dated November 10, 1995, 
after the sale of Hernandez's boat, which notably fails to allege compliance 
with (or even to mention) the lien foreclosure law in general or U.C.A. 38-
2-4 in particular. (R. 225-226; R. 292 at 128; R. 307.) The letter states, 
"Pursuant to your agreement with my client, Performance Auto & Marine 
has successfully sold your boat to a third party buyer." 
d. There was no express agreement between the parties for the 
sale of Hernandez's boat. The only agreement the Appellants allege existed 
between the parties for the sale of Hernandez's boat was one arising from 
the fact that Baker claims it was the "normal business practice" of 
Performance Auto & Marine Supply (which Baker claims was "evidenced 
by a sign posted on the wall") that any vehicle or boat left at the 
Performance Auto & Marine Supply shop "after 30 days of the repairs 
being completed would be considered abandoned and sold." (R. 283 at ^ 
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21, a copy of which is found in Exhibit D to the Brief of Appellants; R. 
291 atf 19.) 
The following legal conclusions clearly and properly follow from the foregoing 
undisputed material facts: 
1. The first sale of Hernandez's boat, in 1995, violated U.C.A. § 38-2-4. 
2. Conversion of Hernandez's boat occurred at the first sale. 
3. As a matter of law, Baker is personally liable for the conversion, without 
resort to any "alter ego" or "piercing the corporate veil" theories, by virtue of the 
undisputed fact of his involvement in the material, dispositive facts of the case (even if 
only and at all times in his capacity as an employee and/or officer and/or agent of the 
Corporation. In support of this legal conclusion, Hernandez cites the following 
authorities: 
Restatement of the Law, Second, of Torts 
§ 233. Conversion by Disposition by Agent as Against One Other Than 
Principal 
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (4), one who as agent or servant of a third 
person disposes of a chattel to one not entitled to its immediate possession in 
consummation of a transaction negotiated by the agent or servant, is subject to 
liability for a conversion to another who, as against his principal or master, is 
entitled to the immediate possession of the chattel. 
(2) An agent or servant who negotiates a transaction for the purpose of 
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transferring a proprietary interest in a chattel is not liable for a conversion to 
another who is entitled to its immediate possession, if the actor does not deliver 
the chattel pursuant to such transaction, and if the agent or servant neither knows 
nor has reason to know that his principal or master does not have authority so to 
dispose of it. 
(3) An agent or servant who merely delivers a chattel in consummation of a 
transaction negotiated by his principal or master is not liable for a conversion to 
another who is entitled to the immediate possession of the chattel, if the agent or 
servant neither knows nor has reason to know that his principal or master is not 
authorized so to dispose of it. 
(4) The statement in Subsection (1) is not applicable to an agent or servant who 
disposes of current money, or a document negotiable by common law or by 
statute, pursuant to a transaction by which the transferee becomes a holder in due 
course of such money or document, unless the agent or servant knows of has 
reason to know that his principal or master does not have authority so to dispose 
of it. 
§ 234. Conversion as Against Bailor by Misdelivery 
A bailee, agent, or servant who makes an unauthorized delivery of a chattel is 
subject to liability for conversion to his bailor, principal, or master unless he 
delivers to one who is entitled to immediate possession of the chattel. 
The Restatement, 2d, position is that Baker is personally liable to both Hernandez and the 
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Corporation for his involvement in the conversion by disposition (here, a sale), or 
conversion by misdelivery (it is clear at least that Hernandez's boat was delivered to 
someone other than Hernandez, not entitled to its immediate possession because Utah 
Code Ann. § 38-2-4 was not complied with). There is no contrary Utah statutory or case 
law authority which contradicts the Restatement position, that Hernandez is aware of. 
Utah law clearly recognizes conversion as a cause of action1, and the Restatement, 2d, 
position would serve as a natural and well-reasoned further defining of Utah's conversion 
law. 
Common Law of Torts 
It is irrelevant to the question of Baker's personal^ whether he acted at all times in 
his capacity as an employee, officer or agent of the Corporation. It is axiomatic that 
Baker is personally liable for intentional torts, and due to his involvement in the 
operative facts of the case he is personally liable for the conversion of Hernandez's boat. 
It is a well-established principle of law that when an officer of a corporation commits an 
intentional tort he is personally liable directly, without the need to disregard the corporate 
entity in order to reach him. Baker's actions in appropriating Hernandez's boat and 
selling it without any authority amount to the kind of intentional tort for which a 
corporate officer or shareholder will be liable personally for his own actions. Baker is a 
1
 See, e.g., Lake Philgas Service v. Valley Bank, 845 P.2d 951 (Utah App. 1993) 
(upholding judgment for conversion of a vehicle, with awards of compensatory damages 
of $16,300 and punitive damages of $25,000) and Broadwater v. Old Republic Sur., 854 
P.2d 527 (Utah 1993). 
15 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
proper party defendant in the case before the Court and the judgment rendered against 
him is valid. Baker's "corporate shield defense" is unmeritorious as a matter of law. 
II. THE COURT SHOULD LOOK OUTSIDE THE PLEADINGS 
The narrow interpretation of the meritorious defense rule argued by Baker in the 
Brief of Appellants would only look at the pleadings - the complaint and an answer or 
proposed answer (even if unverified) - and not other undisputed evidence (such as, in the 
case subjudice, the November 10, 1995 letter found at R. 225-6). This is inconsistent 
with established Utah jurisprudence where in motions to dismiss or motions for summary 
judgment, the court will look outside the pleadings if there are indeed additional sources 
or examples of undisputed evidence before the trial court. Doit, Inc. v. Touche, Ross & 
Co., 926 P.2d 835 (Utah 1996); Utah R. Civ. P. 56 2. Just as a motion to dismiss will be 
treated as a motion for summary judgment if there is additional evidence in the file that 
can show what the undisputed facts are, so should a court look outside the pleadings to 
sources of undisputed facts in the file and presented to the trial court for consideration as 
it decides a Rule 60(b) motion to set aside. Id. See also, Eastmondv. Earl, 912 P.2d 994 
(UtahApp. 1996). 
In the instant case the trial court had a very critical, material piece of evidence 
2
 Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) states: "The judgment sought shall be rendered if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with 
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there 
is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages." 
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before it which establishes the core operative fact of the case: the letter dated November 
19, 1995 from the Appellants' first trial court attorney, Daniel Gibbons, which admits 
that "Performance Auto & Marine" sold Hernandez's boat, but makes no mention of the 
workman's lien foreclosure laws, but instead claims the boat was sold pursuant to mutual 
agreement. (R. 225-226; R. 292 at f^ 28; R. 307.) This is manifestly inconsistent with a 
lien foreclosure sale made pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-2-4. The Court must also 
note that Baker and the Corporation knew very well at around the time of the November 
10, 1995, letter from Mr. Gibbons that Hernandez disputed the claim to a sale by mutual 
agreement, and a workman's lien was clearly implicated from the circumstances, yet 
Baker and/or Performance did not make any claim of having sold Hernandez's boat 
through a legitimate lien foreclosure sale pursuant to § 38-2-4 until more than a year 
later, after a purported second sale of a boat which had already been sold, according to 
Baker's (and the Corporation's) repeated statements. 
The narrow, cribbed interpretation of the 60(b) meritorious defense rule urged by 
the Appellants, which would look only at the pleadings - in the instant case, a Verified 
Complaint and a notably unverified Answer - hobbles the genetic rationale for Justice 
Durham's dissent in Musselman and the unanimous Erickson and Lund decisions which 
sprang from it. The Musselman dissent and the Erickson and Lund opinions rejected the 
idea that a defendant who has demonstrated an acceptable excuse for the entry of default 
should **et be required to prove his defense by a preponderance of the evidence - a trial 
standard without the opportunity and process a trial gives for a party to so prove his case. 
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(See, for example, Lund, 11 P.3d at 283, f 29.) All three opinions express the common 
theme articulated in Lund as follows: 
"Moreover, we have clearly articulated the fundamental policy underlying 
the meritorious defense rule. That policy is simply to prevent the necessity 
of treating defenses that are frivolous on their face. Thus, where a party 
presents a clear and specific proffer of a defense that, if proven, would 
preclude total or partial recovery by the claimant or counterclaimant, it has 
adequately shown a nonfrivolous and meritorious defense for the purposes 
of its motion to set aside a default judgment." 
11 P.3d at 283, ^ f 29. There is nothing in this rule of decision and the considerations 
which underpin it that militates against looking beyond the pleadings to other 
undisputable evidence before the trial court as it determines whether the defendants have 
"a defense entitled to be tried." Erickson, 882 P.2d at 1149, quoting the dissent of 
Musselman at 1059. There are well-established standards in the analogous situations of 
motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment where the legal standards are in 
every other respect the same as the 60(b) meritorious defense standard, and judgment can 
only be rendered against a party if the material facts are undisputed, construing all 
ambiguity in favor of the party against whom judgment is sought, such that judgment can 
be rendered as a matter of law. A defense which lacks sufficient legal merit to prevent 
judgment as a matter of law is an unmeritorious defense, whether it be a motion to 
dismiss, a motion for summary judgment or a motion to set aside. "Judgment as a matter 
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of law" should not mean different things and require different standards in clearly 
analogous circumstances where the interests are the same. A defendant who loses a 
motion for summary judgment has no more or less meritorious a defense than a 
defendant who is unable to show a meritorious defense in a 60(b) motion - neither 
defense is "entitled to be tried." 
The language the Supreme Court chose in Lund v. Brown deserves careful 
attention. It says that a defendant must "present[] a clear and specific proffer of a 
defense that, if proven, would preclude total or partial recovery by the claimant." 11 P.2d 
at 283 (emphasis added). In the instant case, neither Baker nor t he Corporation have 
presented a clear and specific proffer of a defense against Hernandez's allegations and 
claims, as is shown supra in this brief. They have not even proffered any specific 
defense to their own letter dated November 10, 1995, which on its face shows that the 
sale of Hernandez's boat was not in compliance with Utah Code Ann. § 38-2-4. And any 
claim that the sale was made pursuant to an agreement clearly lacks merit as well, as is 
shown from the Appellants inability to show a legally and factually meritorious argument 
that it was. 
The jurisprudential tunnel vision which the Appellants favor would do nothing 
less than give license to obfuscating technicalities and gamesmanship at the expense of 
justice, equity, the search for truth, and the rule of law. It would lead, even more than is 
true of present practice, to Answers consisting of denials, general and otherwise, which 
would push pleading practice into ethically shady areas where good will becomes lost in 
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the murk. That is the wrong direction to take the law. 
III. PUNITIVE DAMAGES ARE JUSTIFIED AS A MATTER OF LAW 
The Appellants' conduct in selling Hernandez's boat and trailer was willful and 
malicious and evinces a reckless disregard for Hernandez's rights. Utah Code Ann., § 
78-18-l(l)(a) provides, "[ejxcept as otherwise provided by statute, punitive damages 
may be awarded only if compensatory or general damages are awarded and it is 
established by clear and convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of the tortfeasor 
are the result of willful and malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that 
manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of 
others." 
State Law 
Utah case law on punitive damages is set forth in Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch, 
817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991) (Crookston I) and Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937 
(Utah 1993) (Crookston II). The Utah Supreme Court in Crookston I articulated the 
following seven factors to evaluate a claim for punitive damages: 
(i) the relative wealth of the defendant; (ii) the nature of the alleged misconduct; 
(iii) the facts and circumstances surrounding such conduct; (iv) the effect thereof 
on the lives of the plaintiff and others; (v) the probability of future recurrence of 
the misconduct; (vi) the relationship of the parties; and (vii) the amount of actual 
damages awarded. 
Crookston I, 817 P.2d at 808. 
The Crookston factors were further upheld in the seminal case of Campbell v. State Farm 
Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 2001 UT 89, the largest punitive damages case in Utah history. In 
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Campbell v. State Farm, the Utah Supreme Court, after conducting a thorough 
Crookston analysis, reinstated a $145 million punitive damages award which had been 
reduced by the trial court to $25 million. In addition, the court in Campbell considered 
the recent United States Supreme Court cases of Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman 
Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001), and BMW v. Gore of North America, Inc., 517 
U.S. 559 (1996), and found the $145 million punitive damages award (representing a 
145:1 ratio of punitive to compensatory damages) to be consistent with the holdings in 
those cases. 
The application of the facts of this case to the Crookston factors clearly supports 
Hernandez's $25,000 punitive damages judgment: 
1. The relative wealth of the defendant. The Appellants' failure to respond to 
Hernandez's discovery has impeded Hernandez in trying to gain evidence of defendant's 
wealth. However, given the modesty of Hernandez's request for punitive damages in 
relation to his actual damages, this first factor in the Crookston analysis is less important 
than the others. See Lake Philgas Service v. Valley Bank, 845 P.2d 951 (Utah App. 
1993) (upholding judgment for conversion of a vehicle, with awards of compensatory 
damages of $16,300 and punitive damages of $25,000) - almost the precise conduct and 
precise ratio as the instant case involves. 
2. The nature of the alleged misconduct. The Utah Supreme Court in Campbell stated 
that "[t]his factor specifically analyzes the nature of the defendant's conduct in terms of 
its maliciousness, reprehensibility, and wrongfulness. It mirrors the 'reprehensibility' 
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factor described by the United States Supreme Court in BMW of North America, Inc. v. 
Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996)." In the instant case, the Appellants' misconduct is egregious. 
The Appellants essentially stole Hernandez's boat after he entrusted it to them, and then 
lied about it. Simply requiring the Appellants to repay their ill-gotten gain would neither 
do justice nor provide a sufficient disincentive for future conduct. Otherwise, the 
Appellants might find their conduct to be a convenient means of acquiring property 
without the trouble of having the previous owner actually consent to the change in 
ownership. 
3. The facts and circumstances surrounding such conduct. The Utah Supreme Court in 
Campbell explained that "this factor looks to the circumstances surrounding the illegal 
conduct, particularly with respect to what the defendant knew and what was motivating 
his or her actions. See Bundy v. Century Equip. Co., 692 P.2d 754, 759 (Utah 1984)." 
(Citation in original). The Appellants' conduct was intentional and demonstrated a 
reckless disregard for Hernandez's rights. Appellants' conduct was precisely of the kind 
contemplated for an award of punitive damages under U.C.A. § 78-18-1. 
4. The effect thereof on the lives of the plaintiff and others. Here, the effect of 
Appellants' conduct on Hernandez was straightforward - Hernandez was deprived of the 
value, use and enjoyment of his family recreational boat. 
5. The probability of future recurrence of the misconduct. While Hernandez has no 
evidence of a past pattern of like conduct by the Appellants, the clear and easy gain the 
Appellants enjoyed from unlawfully taking Hernandez's boat must be punished to 
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dissuade Appellants from future conduct. Similar opportunities for illicit gain could 
present themselves to Appellants in the future. 
6. The relationship of the parties. In this case, the Appellants occupied a special position 
of trust in relation to Hernandez. Appellants provided consumer boat repair services, and 
were bailees to Hernandez. This relationship is one of the most important factors 
justifying punitive damages. Hernandez entrusted his boat to the Appellants, and the 
Appellants abused that trust with malicious disregard for Hernandez's rights. 
7. The amount of actual damages awarded. The amount of Hernandez's actual damages 
is approximately $12,500. The $25,000 in punitive damages is double the actual 
damages, and is clearly not excessive in relation to actual damages. In fact, the requested 
punitive damages are conservative, especially in light of Appellants' conduct. See Lake 
Philgas Service v. Valley Bank, 845 P.2d 951. 
Federal Law 
In addition to the Crookston factors which set forth state law, the court must look 
at the BMW factors which reflect federal constitutional law. In the BA4W case three 
"guideposts" were identified: "[1] the degree of reprehensibility of the [conduct]; [2] the 
disparity between the harm or potential harm suffered . . . and [the] punitive damages 
award; and [3] the difference between this remedy [the punitive damage award] and the . 
. . penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases." Campbell v. State Farm, citing 
BMW at 574-575. As the Campbell court noted, the reprehensibility guidepost of the 
BMW is essentially the same as the second and third Crookston factors, so further 
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analysis is unnecessary. With regard to the second guidepost, the punitive damages 
claimed by Hernandez in the instant case fall well within constitutional limits. Looking 
at the third guidepost, "the difference between [the punitive damage award] and the . . . 
penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases," punitive damages are clearly 
justified. What the Appellants did is commit theft, and based on the dollar value of 
Hernandez's boat, it falls in the range for a second degree felony. See U.C.A. § 76-6-
412. In addition, U.C.A. § 76-6-412(2) authorizes an action for treble damages. 
Hernandez's judgment basically equates to treble damages, and is clearly not excessive in 
light of the criminal and civil penalties provided in § 76-6-412. 
Both Utah and federal law clearly support Hernandez's judgment for punitive 
damages. The award of punitive damages are based on reason or justice, and not 
passion or prejudice. Lake Philgas, 845 P.2d at 959. 
IV, THE CORPORATION IS NOT ENTITLED TO RELIEF UNDER RULE 
60(b) 
The judgment against the Corporation should stand because the Corporation was 
properly joined as a party, it had actual notice of the proceedings, and failed to take 
action to prevent a default judgment against it. The essence of the notice contemplated 
by Rule 4, U.R.C.P., is actual notice. The Corporation clearly had actual notice of being 
joined as a party. In fact, little would have been accomplished by attempting to go 
through the motions of serving a summons on the Corporation since Baker, the registered 
agent, could not be found at the registered office of the corporation. By the time Baker 
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was served with a summons for the second time in this litigation, months before the 
Corporation was joined as a party, Performance was no longer doing business at the 
address listed for the corporation's registered agent and Baker could not be found there. 
The fact that the original Complaint named Performance Auto & Marine Supply 
as a d.b.a. of Baker is a non-prejudicial misnomer. See Wilcox v Geneva Rock Corp., 
911 P.2d 367 (Utah 1996). There can be no doubt that Baker, both in his "individual 
capacity" and his "representative capacity" for the Corporation, knew that the claims of 
the Complaint were equally directed against the Corporation as they were against him 
personally. Baker, as the President, director, and registered agent of the Corporation, 
clearly had notice from the beginning of this matter, even prior to litigation, that the 
Corporation was implicated in liability. Indeed, Baker's sole defense "in his personal 
capacity" can fairly be characterized as materially and operatively relying on the 
Corporation having liability. Baker calls it his "corporate shield defense." 
The Corporation relies on the defense of lack of jurisdiction by virtue of the 
failure of the Amended Complaint and a Summons to have been served on Baker while 
wearing his hat as corporate representative, instead of Baker without the hat. This view 
ignores the substantive law infusing the jurisdictional ontology - that of actual notice and 
nexus which comports with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." 
(Citing International Shoe Co., v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
The Utah Court of Appeals case of Sulzen v. Williams, 977 P.2d 497 (Utah App. 
1999) strongly supports the relation back doctrine by cementing the identify of interest 
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test by holding that where real parties in interest were sufficiently alerted to the 
proceedings, or were involved in them unofficially from an early stage (both of which are 
true of the Corporation in the instant case), liberal amendment and relation back precepts 
should be applied. In the instant case, any amendment of the complaint to include the 
Corporation, which will be based on all of the identical material facts as the original 
complaint, relates back to the filing date of the original complaint. There is no bar of 
claims against the Corporation from the operation of a statute of limitations. 
Furthermore, the claims against the Corporation would not be barred by untimely 
service, according to the rule of Valley Asphalt, Inc., v. Eldon J. Stubbs Construction, 
Inc., 714 P.2d 1142 (Utah 1986), a suit for foreclosure of mechanic's lien, which held 
that if a summons is issued and served timely against one defendant, other defendants, 
whether named in original complaint or brought in by amendment, may be served 
anytime before trial. This holding merely affirms the clear language of Utah R. Civ. P. 
4(b). See also Ringwoodv. Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350 (Utah App. 1990) 
(finding relation back even if statute has run, and that actual notice in case of new claims 
was sufficient provided they were founded on the same basic transaction and facts; the 
corporate veil was pierced.) 
It should be understood that default was not entered against the Corporation for 
failure to answer the call of a summons, but rather the call of discovery. The Corporation 
had been duly joined as a party, but did not respond in any way to discovery requests or a 
motion and order to compel issued to it. Presumably that failure was excused by the trial 
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court, because the first prong was of the Rule 60(b) test was ignored. That should also 
mean that the trial court found the Corporations jurisdictional arguments without merit. 
Hernandez will now distinguish the authorities cited by the Corporation in its brief 
from the instant case. State Dept of Social Services v. Vijil, 784 P.2dl 130 (Utah 1989) 
is distinguishable because it deals with subject-matter jurisdiction of a Navajo aboriginal 
American living within the boundaries of the Navajo Tribal Reservation. Personal 
jurisdiction was not addressed, and the case does not deal with substantively correct, but 
formally incorrect, notice. 
Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288 (Utah 1986) is distinguishable because the 
defendant did not receive actual notice. Here, Baker, agent for Performance, received 
actual notice. 
Dipoma v. McPhie, 29 P.3d 1225 (Utah 2001) is inapposite, as it deals with 
failure to file an original filing fee. 
Donner v. Sulcus Computer Corp., 103 F.R.D. 548 (1984) is distinguishable 
because rules of civil procedure required the plaintiff to obtain leave of court to amend 
its complaint, and the plaintiff failed to obtain such leave. In the instant case, the 
Appellee obtained leave of court as required by Rule 15, Utah R. Civ. P. 
Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460, 120 S.Ct 1579, 146 L.Ed.2d 530 
(2000) is also distinguishable because in that case a defendant was joined after judgment 
was rendered and he did not have any meaningful opportunity to be heard, in violation of 
his due process rights. The procedural history of the Nelson case is substantially 
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different than that of the instant case. Rule 59(e) was invoked, after judgment was 
rendered, to add a party. But in the instant case, a proper motion under Rule 15 was filed 
to join Performance, the amended complaint was provided (but mysteriously not filed) as 
an exhibit to the motion, the court ordered that Performance be joined, and all of this was 
served by mail on counsel for Kelly Baker, with Baker being the registered agent for 
Performance. Hernandez's counsel followed up with Baker's counsel by letter inquiring 
why the Amended Complaint had not been answered. R. 105. Unlike Nelson, 
Performance had actual notice before judgment was entered and ample opportunity to 
compose a response and be heard in court. 
If notice would have been served on the Utah Department of Commerce, Division 
of Corporations and Commercial Code because neither Baker nor the corporation could 
be located at their registered address, it hardly would have been likely to provide actual 
notice to the corporation, or to Baker as agent for the corporation. The irony is that 
formally serving the Division of Corporations would have constituted the observance of 
form at the expense of substantive notice, while the informal service on Baker's attorney 
provided actual, substantive notice, though lacking in strict adherence to prescribed form. 
The Corporation's jurisdictional defense lacks sufficient substance to require reversal of 
the trial court's order denying the motion to set aside. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's order denying Appellants' motion to set aside should be affirmed 
and the case remanded for entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent 
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with the Court of Appeals' opinion in the instant case. 
DATED this 9 it** day of April, 2004. 
C^n 
Thomas P. Isom (6895) 
Attorney for Appellee 
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